The 2025 ‘Coup’ and 2027 Outlook

Political Musing of Thursday February,5 2026 

By Ike Abonyi

“It is bad governments, not bad people, who cause revolutions.” - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.

The most significant evils that humanity has faced stem from bad governments that refuse to listen to the voices of the people. In 1966, a group of young Nigerian military officers, angered by the politicians' mishandling of a newly independent nation, orchestrated a coup that dismissed the political elite. The perpetrators, who came from various ethnic and geopolitical backgrounds, executed a plan that was dubiously associated with the Igbo people due to the ethnicity of its leader, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. This coup laid the groundwork for numerous subsequent successful and failed coups in Nigeria. Sixty years later, the repercussions of that coup continue to haunt not only the Igbo but the entire nation, as the interpretation of those events led to a brutal 30-month civil war.

Fast forward to September 2025, when reports emerged about military personnel being arrested for plotting to overthrow President Bola Tinubu and undermine the democratic process that has been in place since 1999. Initially, the military denied that a coup was underway, claiming that some personnel had merely violated military regulations. However, this was just the beginning. By early January 2026, the coup plot was officially confirmed, marking a significant turning point for Nigeria.

The acknowledgment of this coup plot sent shockwaves through Nigeria's political landscape, significantly altering the dynamics leading up to the February 2027 General Elections. This is not merely a military issue; it has become the focal point of the entire 2027 campaign. With the Nigerian Defence Headquarters confirming the coup on January 26, 2026, the discourse has shifted from "rumor" to an undeniable "reality." This moment necessitates serious reflection on the precarious state of Nigeria's democracy and its potential implications for the future.

Despite attempts to distance the coup plot from the trajectory toward 2027, it remains central, particularly as the trial of those involved unfolds. President Tinubu, known for capitalizing on political opportunities, must leverage this trial to secure political gains. The naming of suspects, which appears to correlate with specific ethnic and religious affiliations, poses a risk. If the majority of suspects were Igbos, this could easily be labeled as yet another "Igbo coup." For now, this narrative has not been tagged as a "Fulani or Hausa coup." Until Nigeria confronts its deep-seated Igbophobia, it will struggle to address its numerous problems—though that is a conversation for another day.

Currently, we must examine how this coup influences the upcoming General Elections in 2027. The failed coup may have inadvertently provided the ruling APC with a formidable rhetorical weapon. The administration is framing the elections as a choice between "Democratic Continuity" and "Chaos." By highlighting this coup, Tinubu’s camp can label opposition figures as potentially "destabilizing" influences, regardless of any direct evidence. Such narratives often incite a "rally 'round the flag" effect, leading moderate voters—who are wary of military interventions—to gravitate toward the incumbent for the sake of stability, despite ongoing economic grievances. 

But the identification of civilian figures—such as a former governor and a retired general as alleged financial backers and all APC members and sympathizers, the opposition can easily finger who brought our democracy to this door. Overzealous security forces may exploit the coup to intensify scrutiny of political gatherings, campaign funding, and opposition movements under the guise of "national security." Tinubu who is averse to political campaign may hide under this to dodge meeting the people with his scorecards during the electioneering. Additionally, the National Electoral Commission, already suffering from a trust deficit, could use the specter of the coup to align itself with the incumbent. Critics justifiably worry that the "threat of instability" will justify a heavier security presence at the polls in 2027, a scenario that historically leads to voter intimidation and diminishes turnout in opposition strongholds, especially as this regime may have little to offer voters.

Perhaps most critically, this coup narrative will significantly impact the fragmentation and realignment within the geopolitical North. This incident is perceived as a Northern coup since it primarily involves officers from the North expressing frustration over stagnant promotions. Consequently, this has intensified discourse around the "Northern Agenda" for 2027 and the overt nepotism surrounding the Tinubu administration. A visible rift is emerging among Northern elites, dividing them between loyalty to the Tinubu-Shettima ticket and those feeling marginalized. The coup attempt complicates the rise of radical or "anti-system" candidates, prompting the North to consolidate around a more traditional candidate. The stakes in 2027 have never been higher, and the implications of this coup will resonate throughout the political landscape for years to come.

The Tinubu administration must urgently confront the concerning rationale behind the brutal notion of dismantling our democratic government. Notably, many characters involved have ties to the APC. It is crucial to assess how the broader population would have reacted if the coup plotters had succeeded. 

Reports suggest that the motivations behind this conspiratorial attempt are rooted in a troubling mix of personal grievances and systemic failures. Discontent is brewing, particularly among officers frustrated by stalled promotions and unsuccessful examinations, creating a "disgruntled element" ripe for radicalization. If biases in promotions exist, they reflect a troubling one-sidedness that could exacerbate regional tensions. The concentration of plotters from specific geographical areas has already reignited debates about regional balance and loyalty within our security forces. This unfortunate trend did not begin with Tinubu; it has been present since the APC assumed power in 2015.

While the coup's self-serving motivations are evident, we cannot ignore the fragility of our economy, which provides a grim backdrop. Coups do not arise in prosperous environments. This military plot has been fueled by a climate of inflation and hardship, offering the putschists a form of "moral justification" to sway public sentiment. The significant economic and political grievances present in society create fertile ground for these coup plotters to gain sympathy—an alarming reality for the ruling elite.

The very idea of violently overthrowing an elected government should ring alarm bells for President Tinubu and his administration. While those in power may be able to push the populace to their limits, they must recognize that provoking the public can lead to unpredictable and dangerous consequences. Even though it is an extreme response, a thorough examination of the coup's causes is not just necessary; it is imperative.

As the government navigates the aftermath, it must prioritize justice alongside stabilization efforts. Initiating a General Court Martial is not merely necessary; it is essential for maintaining institutional discipline. Failing to act against these treasonous actions invites future coup attempts. For the Tinubu administration to navigate this perilous landscape successfully, transparency must take precedence. The trial must be perceived as fair and based on solid evidence to dispel any notions of a "political witch-hunt." Every effort must be made to uphold the professionalism of our armed forces. The Defense Headquarters’ assertion that this is a "purely disciplinary" affair should reassure both the public and international investors that the military remains committed to constitutional loyalty.

Moreover, beyond the court-martial, the Tinubu administration must address the underlying morale issues within the military, including personnel welfare and the politicization of appointments. Most importantly, this situation demands heightened democratic vigilance as we approach the pivotal 2027 general elections. The INEC, security agencies, and judiciary must recognize this coup attempt as a "stress test" for Nigerian democracy. It is a moment for unity among all political actors, from the ruling party to the opposition, forged in a shared commitment to the ballot box as the only legitimate pathway for change.

The transition from "consumption to production," as articulated by opposition leaders like Peter Obi, can only occur within a stable republic. A coup is never a solution to poor governance; it undermines the very foundation upon which good governance rests.

Nigeria has emerged from a severe crisis, narrowly averting disaster. The exposure of this coup plot stands as a testament to intelligence and adherence to the rule of law, but it also serves as a sobering warning. Democracy is not a static achievement; it requires ongoing maintenance. The trial of these officers transcends the fates of 16 individuals; it is about reaffirming the supremacy of the Nigerian people over the barrel of a gun.

Our hypocrisy will be judged by a higher authority if we penalize coup plotters intent on seizing power through violence while simultaneously engaging in manipulative practices that undermine the will of Nigerian voters. We must confront the hard truth: it is not malevolent individuals that incite revolutions, but bad governments—whether they be civilian or military. We must not shy away from rejecting corrupt governments for fear of military intervention; to do so would be like suggesting we accept death to avoid the possibility of dying. God help us